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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1137  
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0128  
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0074  
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0363  
RHMFISS/CJTJF HOA PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000933

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/C,  
NSC FOR BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON  
USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2018  
TAGS: [KPKO](#) [PGOV](#) [PHUM](#) [PREL](#) [SU](#)  
SUBJECT: SUDAN WON'T STOP UNTIL DEBY STOPS, CLAIMS GOS  
PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR

REF: A. KHARTOUM 924  
[1](#)B. KHARTOUM 918

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Classified By: Charge d'affaires Alberto M. Fernandez,  
Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

[1](#)1. (C) SUMMARY. For the GoS to refrain from interfering in Chad, Chadian President Idris Deby must stop his support for Darfur rebel groups, particularly the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) led by Khalil Ibrahim, GoS NCP Presidential Advisor Mustafa Osman Ismail told CDA Fernandez. On a recent visit to Paris, the GoS asked France to act as a "guarantor" that would prevent Chadian-backed Darfur rebel groups from embarking on military escapades from Chad into Sudan. To balance the agreement, the GoS said it would allow the Government of Chad to choose another country to act as guarantor to prevent Chadian rebel groups from crossing from Sudan into Chad. The French are considering the proposal. The GoS has also made its position clear to Libyan President Muammar Qaddafi. END SUMMARY.

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SUDAN'S POSITION ON CHADIAN INTERFERENCE  
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[1](#)2. (C) Influential Presidential Advisor and shrewd NCP external affairs strategist Mustafa Osman Ismail told CDA Fernandez on 23 June that he informed French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner and Libyan President Muammar Qaddafi that unless Chadian President Idris Deby halted support to Darfur rebels and incursions into Sudan, the GoS would continue to put up a fight against him and his regime in Chad. "If Deby continues to support the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), terrorists and other Sudanese opposition forces, we cannot allow him to sit still," said Ismail. "We (the GoS will support the Chadian opposition forces) at least to keep him busy," he continued.

[1](#)3. (C) Ismail claimed that during his recent trip to Paris with GNU Foreign Minister Deng Alor, the GoS made it clear to French FM Kouchner and other French Foreign Ministry officials that it is not the GoS' intention to oust Chadian President Deby and wreck his regime, but rather to "change Deby's behavior in supporting Darfuri rebels in Sudan." In order to do this, said Ismail, we need a "guarantor" that can stop Deby's incursions into Darfur and we want that guarantor to be France. At the same time, explained Ismail, Chad should choose a guarantor, whether it be China, South Africa,

Egypt or another nation, to guarantee that the GoS does not interfere with Chad. Ismail said that he met Libyan President Qaddafi recently on two occasions, once in Tripoli and a second time at the June Community of Sahel-Sahara States (CENSAD) conference in Benin, and presented to him the same GoS position on the Chad-Sudan conflict. Ismail said that the French agreed to discuss the prospect of being a guarantor, would follow up with Deby, and get back to the Sudanese. IsmaQmhavior towards Chad.

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DARFUR, SUDAN-CHAD POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS INTERTWINED  
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¶4. (C) Ismail stated that are three Darfur issues which must be pursued simultaneously. First, Sudan and Chad must find a working mechanism whereby cross-border incursions are prevented, and there should be a settlement between the Government of Chad and the Chadian opposition, as well as a settlement between the GoS and the Sudanese Darfur rebel (particularly the Zaghawa) opposition. Second, there needs to be a Darfur political settlement between the GoS, Darfur rebel factions such as JEM and the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM)- AbdulWahid Al-Nur, the international community, and other Darfuri groups such as IDPs, civil society, Arab tribes. Third, UNAMID needs immediate financial and logistical support to be effective on the ground. Ismail also mentioned the importance of humanitarian assistance in Darfur. Finding a political settlement to Darfur cannot be separated from a Chad-Sudan settlement, said Ismail. "I told the French, it (the means for resolving the Darfur conflict)

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should start with Chad and end with Chad."

¶5. (C) CDA Fernandez told Ismail that these steps are legitimate, but suggested that the GoS could do more. For example, said Fernandez, the GoS mishandled the arrest and detention of hundreds of Zaghawa in Khartoum following the May 10 JEM attack on Omdurman (ref B). "You (the GoS) overreacted, abused and tortured many," said Fernandez, and by doing this you "angered many and drove them into Khalil Ibrahim's hands." Ismail countered that Sudanese national security forces (NISS) had a right to arrest and question many following the attack and noted that all governments tend to overreact when threatened (usually a veiled Sudanese reference to Guantanamo, Abu Ghuraib, Iraq. and Palestine as excuses for bad Sudanese behavior). He also claimed that the GoS did things following the attacks, such as making it known that JEM employs child soldiers and allowing UNICEF to witness the children, which was not adequately or positively covered by the press and for which the international community did not give the GoS any due credit. Continuing, Ismail claimed, "NISS did not kill one innocent person following the attack."

¶6. (U) On the matter of UNAMID, Fernandez agreed with Ismail that UNAMID deployment has lagged, in large part due to UN bureaucracy and indecision and not entirely the fault of the GoS. He challenged Ismail for the GoS to do more on UNAMID by going the extra mile to help speed up deployment and specifically asked for intervention to issue five remaining US military observer visas that have now been pending for months. Ismail said he would check into the issue.

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SUDANESE-US BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS  
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¶7. (C) Ismail questioned the real reason behind Special Envoy Richard Williamson's hasty departure from Khartoum on 4 June and the subsequent suspension of US-Sudan bilateral negotiations. Ismail said that he and Presidential Advisor Nafie Ali Nafie believe that the walk-out and suspension of dialogue was not a sole decision by SE Williamson, but rather a decision from Washington that there should be no deal between the US and Sudan. Some in the regime believe the U.S.

was never serious about negotiating with Sudan in the first place while others are waiting to see what happens if Williamson's concerns are addressed, "will you come up with new excuses?" CDA Fernandez answered that the U.S. was sincere but explained that NCP-SPLM lack of a way forward on Abyei and Sudan's support to Chadian rebels were major obstacles to the continuation of US-Sudanese bilateral negotiation. If an interim administration for Abyei is named per the June 8 Abyei Agreement, said Fernandez, it will be a positive step. The USG, he said, is watching Abyei and Sudanese intentions towards Chad closely. CDA asked about President Al-Bashir's saber rattling against the US, ICC and others in a June 22 speech to Popular Defense Forces (PDF) units in Sennar. Ismail laughed that "it is an election season in Sudan, as it is in America, and you shouldn't take these things too seriously."

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COMMENT

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18. (C) The GoS hopes that French engagement will assist in putting an end to Sudan-Chad cross-border incursions. Although the GoS claims it will end its support to Chadian rebels if Deby withdraws his support for Sudanese Darfur rebels (particularly the JEM), the distrust of the two regimes and their mutual lack of full control of their respective territories makes it unlikely that either side will end support for each other's rebels. The visit to Paris was also presumably intended to pressure and provoke Deby. Ismail's comments about UNAMID either demonstrate that the regime will tell us whatever we want to hear, or show that the Sudanese regime has gradually recognized that UNAMID deployment is in its interests as a way to re-establish security in what has become a completely anarchic region - a remarkable evolution for a regime that only a year ago fought hard to scuttle and weaken UNSCR 1769. The regime does not want UNAMID to become too strong, but it does want to prevent the situation in Darfur from spiraling completely out of its own control.

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19. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.  
FERNANDEZ